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RECENT CASE NOTES
COMMON-LAw MA tR GE-DvORCE-SUPPORT PENDENTE Lrrm.-Plantiff, claim-
ing to be the common-law wife of defendant, sued for divorce and asked for
temporary alimony. The parties had lived together since 1929 and were known
as husband and wife. Defendant denied the marriage and contended that
support pendente lite could be allowed only when a marriage had been
solemnized pursuant to the statutes of the state. Held, judgment that defendant
pay plaintiff $10 per week pendente lite affirmed. rgiroff v. Argiroff (Ind.
1939), 19 N. E. (2d) 560.
Legislative bodies have from early times enacted measures to restrict
common-law marriages. In 1563 the Council of Trent decreed that marriage
by simple contract without more should be invalid in Civil law countries. 1 In
1753 Lord Hardwick's act declared void all marriages in England which did
not observe all the specified formalities. 2 All the states likewise have statutes
prescribing formalities for marriage and divorce.3
While the legislatures have been enacting statutes to restrict common-law
marriages, the courts, aided by rules of presumption in favor of the validity
of marriage, have consistently sustained their validity unless the statute contains
express words of nullity.4 This attitude of the courts in England has resulted
in giving limited effect only to common-law marriages.5 However, "a marriage
in America is full and complete in every respect or it does not exist at all".6
1 "The 'Decretum de Reformatio Matrimonii' was passed November 11,
1563. Of course, this applied only to Roman Catholic countries, and, therefore,
was inapplicable in England". Jacobs, Cases and Materials on Domestic Rela-
tions (1939), p. 99, n. (2). Cf. Hallett v. Collins (1852), 51 U. S. 174, 13
L. ed. 376.
226 Geo. II, c. 33 (1753). England recognized common-law marriages
contracted in Scotland. As a result the famous "Gretna Green" marriages
began. Lord Hardwick's act was avoided by English couples crossing the
border and entering into common-law marriages at "Gretna Green" Scotland.
This act did not apply to the American colonies. Cheney v. Arnold (1857),
15 N. Y. 345, 69 Am. Dec. 609.
8 For the statutes affecting common-law marriage in the various -jurisdic-
tions see: I Vernier, American Family Laws (1931), p. 108. For the Indiana
statutes see: Burns Ind. Stat. (1933), § 44-101 ff. (marriage) and § 3-1201 ff.
(divorce).
4 Meister v. Moore (1877), 96 U. S. 76, 24 L. ed. 826; Mathewson v.
Phoenix Iron Foundry (1884), 20 Fed. 281. But see: Milford v. Worcester
(1810), 7 Mass. 48.
5 Lavery v. Hutchinson (1911), 24-9 Il. 86, 94. N. E. 6, states that a wife
in a common-law marriage was not entitled to dower. Denison v. Denison
(1872), 35 Md. 361, states that such contracts could be carried into effect and
execution by the Ecclesiastical courts. In Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (Consistancy
Court of London, 1811), 161 Eng. Rep. 665, the court said, "All marriages not
celebrated according to the prescribed form, are mere nullities; there is and
can be no such thing in this country as an irregular marriage". See: Regina
v. Millis (1843), 9 H. of L. Cas. 319, 8 Eng. Rep. 844; Beamish v. Beamish
(1861), 9 H. of L. Cas. 274, 11 Eng. Rep. 735.
6 Black, "Common Law Marriage" (1928), 2 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 113. In
Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman (1930), 91 Ind. App. 363, 364, 171 N. E.
241, the court said, "Such contracting parties are husband and wife as fully
and to the same effect and extent as if there had been a statutory and cere-
monial marriage". Accord: Lavery v. Hutchinson (1911), 249 Ill. 86, 94
N. E. 6.
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The Indiana decisions holding that the statutes regulating marriage are not
exclusive are in accord with the tendency indicated.7 Thus property rights
and rights under workmen's compensation statutes9 have been enforced on the
basis of a common-law marriage. The principal case is apparently the first
in Indiana and one of the few in the United States to raise the issue of the
validity of common-law marriage when one of the parties brings an action
for divorce.' 0 The language used indicates a leniency in determining there
was a marriage when one of the most important incidents of marriage, alimony
pendente lite, is involved."1 If common-law marriages are to be abolished a
statute with express words of nullity will be necessary.12 E. 0. C.
DEFAMATION-LIBEL OF EMPLOYEE-PRIVILEGE.Plaintiff was discharged from
his position as defendant's ticket agent because of unsatisfactory service.
Defendant filed claims with plaintiff's surety for alleged shortages in plaintiff's
account. Plaintiff was not advised of alleged shortages until after he had
left defendant's employ. Evidence was introduced tending to show that
plaintiff's efforts to adjust the claims met with indifference on the part of
defendant's officers and that a thorough investigation was not made prior to
filing claim with the surety company. Plaintiff suffered loss of subsequent
employment because the surety company refused to re-bond him. Action for
7 "This general doctrine extends so far as to sustain the validity of mar-
riage made without complying with forms prescribed by statute, for it is held
that such marriages will be sustained unless the statute expressly declares them
void". Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 135.8 Langdon v. Langdon (1932), 204 Ind. 321, 183 N. E. 400; Compton v.
Benhan (1909), 44 Ind. App. 51, 85 N. E. 365; Roche v. Washington (1862),
19 Ind. 53, 81 Am. Dec. 376; Lawrance v. Lawrance (1932), 95 Ind. App. 345,
182 N. E. 273.9 Dunlap v. Dunlap (1935), 101 Ind. App. 43, 198 N. E. 95; Meehan v.
Edward Valve and Manufacturing Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N. E.
265; Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman (1930), 91 Ind. App. 363, 171
N. E. 241.
lOBecker v. Becker (1913), 153 Wis. 226, 140 N. W. 1082 (divorce and
alimony); Brinkley v. Brinkley (1872), 50 N. Y. 184, 10 Am. Rep. 460 (ali-
mony pendente lite); Cooper v. Cooper (N. J. Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Ct., Essex Co., 1933), 168 A. 153 (support) ; Puntka v. Puntka (1935), 174
Okla. 517, 50 P. (2d) 1092 (Divorce); Strum v. Strum (1932), 111 N. J. Eq.
579, 163 A. 5 (separate maintenance); State v. Superior Court (1909), 55
Wash. 347, 104 P. 771 (separate maintenance); White v. White (1890), 82
Cal. 427, 23 P. 276 (divorce). Cf. Jones v. Jones (1935), 119 Fla. 824, 161
So. 836.
11 The court quoted extensively language from Brinkley v. Brinkley (1872),
50 N. Y. 184, 10 Am. Rep. 460, which in substance said that in applications
for temporary alimony the fact of marriage need not be so conclusively estab-
lished as f6r purpose of permanent alimony.
12 "The American Bar Association, the Commission on Uniform State Laws,
and practically all authorities in the field of social reform favor the abolition
of common-law marriage". I Vernier, American Family Laws (1931), p. 108.
One writer states that "common-law marriages are on their way out without
question". Van Winkle, "Common-law Marriage" (1936), 59 N. J. Law J1. 145,
153. Kentucky abolished common-law marriage in 1852. New York amended
its statute in 1933 so as to contain express words of nullity. The District of
Columbia and 23 states still recognize common-law marriages. I Vernier,
American Family Laws (1931), p. 108.
